Maneuver formations in situations, and he also outlines other details Theįailure to support the Kurds debacle is explored to a limited degree.Īt the tactical level, Macgregor discusses the preference of These people during an unsuccessful insurrection against Saddam. Shiite Arabs and the Kurds resulting in the brutal massacre of scores of The embarrassingĪctions following Desert Storm included American abandonment of the Non-visionary strategic leadership in that conflict.

Republican Guard in Operation Desert Storm was the result of timid, Macgregor feels the failure to comprehensively defeat the Iraqi Gap in WWII, allowing the Germans to survive to fight many more fights. He compares theĮnding of Desert Storm to the failure to completely close the Falaise Macgregor makes a strong, convincing argument that Operation Iraqiįreedom simply started where Desert Storm left off. and fiercely aggressive decisions to win. Reforms to prepare America's armed forces for future wars, which To take a bold stance and to exploit an apparent enemy weakness, as boldĭecisions can also backfire into defeat. Lessons preached, praised, and taught at the combat schools of the U.S.Īrmy since WWII and the success stories of generals like Patton wereīrushed aside, according to Macgregor's analysis. Using only their conservative decision-making skills. Regiment) was ordered to halt and break contact, a result ol generals Then-LTC Douglas Macgregor's rage began toīuild as his Cougar squadron (the 2nd Squadron.

The location where American forces methodically, skillfully, and quicklyĭestroyed the overwhelmed Iraqis in their defensive positions during The savage battle at the north-south gridline called 73 Easting is Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009,

APA style: Warrior's Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting.Warrior's Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting.' Retrieved from MLA style: 'Warrior's Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting.' The Free Library.

Greatest tank battles - 73rd easting